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Abstract 
In this paper, we look at the effect of the financial crisis from an angle overlooked to date in 
the finance literature by investigating composition effects arising from the financial crisis. A 
composition effect is a change in the market risk of a sector that is caused not by a direct change 
in that sector but by a change in another sector that affects the composition of the stock market. 
In the paper we investigate the pre and during crisis market risk of the industrial, banking and 
utilities sectors. Amongst other results, we find, across the G12 countries, a positive 
relationship between the increase in the market risk of industrials during the crisis and both the 
pre-crisis market risk of the banking sector and the scale of the systemic crisis in a country. 
The six G12 countries that experienced a major systematic banking crisis are amongst the seven 
countries with the largest increases in the market risk for industrials. Results drawn from our 
detailed analysis using US data are consistent with these findings. Finally, we show how the 
results add to our understanding of the linkages between the financial and real sector and 
conclude that composition effects of the financial crisis could have a significant chilling effect 
on investment industrials, which is in addition to the effect of other linkages already 
documented. 
JEL classification: G1, G01, G15 
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2007 began in the US, rapidly took the form of a full blown systemic 
crisis in the US and almost immediately became a global phenomenon (Covitz et al., 2013; 
Lane, 2012; Mishkin, 2011; Shiller, 2012). By 2008 there were major systemic banking crises 
in a large number of economies, e.g., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, the 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Spain and the UK, and ‘borderline’ systemic crises in many others such 
as France, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Sweden and Switzerland.  The financial crisis has had 
enormous impact on the financial sector of many developed countries, decimating values of 
financial companies and leading some of the biggest world names in banking to be dependent 
on state financial support to avoid collapse or, in some cases, to be nationalised. Although the 
financial sector has been hardest hit by the crisis, its effect has been felt across the economies 
around the world as the financial crisis has spread, through transmission channels, to the real 
economy. In the US, for example, average annual real GDP growth between 2007 and 2014 
was only 1.22%. This situation is common, e.g., French, German, Dutch and the UK GDP real 
annual growth rate figures for the equivalent period are 0.31%, 1.07%, 0.53%, and 0.82%.2 
The financial crisis and the associated decline of stock market capitalisation has also affected 
the stock market composition in many countries. The aim of this paper is to look at the effect 
of the financial crisis from an angle overlooked to date in the finance literature by investigating 
whether and how this change in the composition of stock markets has impacted on the market 
based risk measures of selected sectors, given that such changes can have economically 
significant implications for the transmission mechanism from the financial to real economy 
and for investment strategies. 
It is common to discuss the financial crisis from the perspective of changes in stock price 
volatility and correlations of individual stocks or whole sectors (e.g., Bartram and Bodnar, 
2009; Bartram et al., 2012; Bates, 2012; Campello et al, 2010), or in the context of financial 
constraints (e.g., Campbell et al., 2011; Duygan-Bump et al., 2015; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2015). 
In this paper, we approach the impact of the financial crisis through an approach that has not 
been investigated so far in the finance literature. That is, we address the question of whether 
there is evidence that the collapse of the banking sector as a proportion of the stock market may 
have impacted on the CAPM factor betas of specific sectors simply because the composition 
of the stock market has changed. It is important to investigate this effect as its existence could 
                                                             
2 The statistics are calculated using OECD  data from http://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-gdp-forecast.htm 
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potentially dampen investment in lower risk sectors and contribute to other transmission 
mechanisms from the financial sector to the real sector. In the paper we focus on the risk of 
industrials, utilities and banking sectors before and during the crisis as there are good 
arguments why these sectors should experience different effects during the crisis. Whilst 
utilities are traditionally seen as defensive stocks, the sector appears to have been thought of 
as particularly low risk and safe havens for investment during the financial crisis. Berkshire-
Hathaway’s utility focused strategy and its expansion in the financial crisis is one of the better 
known examples of this. Unlike utilities, however, industrials have not had a favoured ‘halo 
effect’ during the crisis. We look at the differences in the changes in risk of industrials and 
utilities in the G12 countries and relate this to the impact of the financial crisis on banking.  
 
The theoretical idea underlying our investigation in this paper is straightforward and is outlined 
in the next section. Here we summarise the basic intuition in a simple example where there are 
only two sectors in the stock market. Consider a special simple case where the composition of 
the market changes in such a way that the proportion of the comparatively risky sector falls, 
whilst at the same time the variance-covariance matrix of the expected returns of the two 
sectors remain unchanged. Given that the market weighted sum of the CAPM factor betas must 
sum to one, the CAPM factor beta of the comparatively low risk sector must increase if the 
overall constraint is to be achieved (indeed, the CAPM factor beta can actually increase to such 
an extent that the lower risk sector becomes the higher risk sector). We refer to a change in the 
CAPM factor beta in one sector that arises not from fundamental changes in that sector but as 
a result of the other sector growing or declining as a composition effect. That is, over and above 
any other changes that may be going on, there will be a simple spill-over from the change in 
the higher risk sector on the CAPM factor beta of the low risk sector. If one also makes the 
specific assumption that the returns on the two sectors are the same both before and after the 
composition change, then absent other changes, unless an investor also makes the consequent 
change in their view of the required risk premium, the expected return of the comparatively 
lower market risk sector will appear to be a worse risk adjusted return than before. This may 
lead to difficulties in raising finance in the comparatively low market risk sector or 
underperformance of portfolios based on this sector. However, any such changes arising from 
composition effects would be an ‘erroneous’ transmission mechanism since they do not arise 
from fundamental changes in the lower risk sector. 
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It is worth noting that there is some empirical evidence suggesting that such ‘composition 
effects’ are not unusual. For example, Grout and Zalewska (2006) document that during the 
dotcom bubble the Kalman filter daily betas of old economy stocks fell, both in the UK and in 
the US, for a short period during the dotcom bubble. The dot-com bubble is minor in scale 
when compared to the financial crisis, which suggests that, given the duration, scale of impact 
and global reach of the financial crisis, it may be possible to find significant market risk 
changes induced by the composition changes associated with the financial crisis. It is also 
interesting to note that the driver behind the composition change in the dot-com bubble was 
the ‘opposite’ of the driver behind the composition change arising in the financial crisis. In the 
financial crisis the composition change is driven by a reduction of the proportion of the market 
taken by banking whereas during the dot-com bubble the composition changes arose because 
comparatively higher risk stocks grew as a percentage of the stock market (both through price 
increase and new entry). Therefore, if the new thesis that we investigate in this paper is correct, 
namely that the composition effect of the financial crisis is material and leads to increases in 
risk measures for industrials that may make it harder for them to attract funding, then the 
opposite should have been the case during the dot-com bubble, namely old economy companies 
should have found funding easier despite the competition from high tech stocks. There is 
evidence that the latter is exactly the case (e.g., Campello and Graham, 2013).  
 
The analysis is initially performed on US daily data on sector indexes provided by Professor 
Kenneth French using the three and five Fama-French specification, and using S&P1500 daily 
observations sourced from DataStream using a single factor CAPM. We then undertake a 
comparative investigation of G12 countries (this sample also includes the US) using 
DataStream calculated sector indexes. The sample covers 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014. An 
interesting feature of the crisis for the purposes of the paper is that the scale of the crisis was 
not uniform even across G12 countries. For example, according to Laeven and Valencia’s 
Systemic Crisis Data Bank (Laeven and Valencia, 2013a), amongst the G12 countries the 
financial crisis developed into a major systemic banking crisis in Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the US, whilst France, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland faced 
a marginal systemic crisis, and Australia, Canada, Japan, had no systemic crisis at all. Utilising 
these differences we are able to compare the risk changes across countries that have well 
developed banking systems but suffered different severity of the crisis, with the expectation 
that composition effects would be greatest in countries that experienced major systemic crisis.  
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We find that the CAPM factor beta (further referred to as the beta) of industrials is higher 
during the crisis than before the crisis in the US and for most of the G12 countries. To the 
extent that this increase is caused by composition effects arising from the financial crisis one 
would expect the increase in the beta for industrials to be larger the higher the pre-crisis beta 
of the banking sector and also larger the more severe the systemic banking crisis in a country. 
Across the G12 countries we find such a positive relationship between the increase in the beta 
of industrials relative to pre-crisis levels and the pre-crisis beta of the banking sector. Indeed, 
with the exception of Sweden, we find that all countries with pre-crisis beta of the banking 
sector above one experienced increases in the beta of industrials during the crisis and that all 
countries with pre-crisis beta of the banking sector below one experienced declines in the beta 
of industrials. Furthermore, the six G12 countries that experienced a severe systematic banking 
crisis are amongst the seven countries with the largest increases in the beta for industrials (again 
Sweden is the exception).  Although the beta of the banking sectors changed during the crisis, 
there is no systematic relationship between the scale of the systemic crisis in a country and the 
change in beta of the banking sector in that country. This may result from the policies adopted 
by individual governments and regulators to rescue the sector and limit the consequences of 
the financial crisis. 
The position of utilities is more nuanced. If, as we argue, utilities were seen as particularly low 
risk during the crisis then in the absence of any composition effect we would expect the beta 
to fall. However, the evidence of changes in the beta of industrials suggests that if a 
composition effect is present we would expect a less clear picture with the possibility of beta 
increases. This is exactly the case, i.e., we find that the beta of the utility sector falls in some 
countries and rises in others with increases in the beta outnumbering the declines. 
The format of the paper is as follows. The following section, Section 2, outlines our analytical 
approach and related literature. Section 3 provides justification for the sample selection and 
Section 4 presents the data and methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the results for the US 
and the G12 countries respectively. Section 7 concludes and discusses the implications. 
Appendix 1 shows a mathematical proof of the fact that a change in weights of one sector 
affects the aggregate beta of the other sectors. Appendix 2 provides tables with the GARCH 
effects estimated for the regression specifications used in the paper as well as tables with an 
alternative definition of the financial crisis dummy. 
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2. Analytical Approach 
We begin by giving a more formal discussion of the underlying premise outlined in the 
introduction. Appendix 1 provides more details and the proof of Proposition 1 (see below).  
Following from the assumption of the existence of a linear relationship between risk and 
expected returns, the CAPM determined market risk of individual assets used to construct the 
market portfolio sum to one when weighted by their market capitalisation. That is, if there are 
N assets traded on the market, wT = 1, where wT = [w1,…, wN] is a vector of capitalisation-
based weights and T = [1, …, N] is a vector of systematic risks (i.e., the betas) corresponding 
to these N assets. Hence, if the proportion of any asset included in the market portfolio changes 
other conditions held constant (e.g., volatility of the individual assets, their cross-correlations, 
expected returns), then changes in the weights of the other assets can be expected. This, 
however, changes the composition of the market portfolio and, consequently, the 
interdependencies of each asset with the market portfolio and the volatility of the market 
portfolio. Hence, changes in the beta of the assets can be expected even if there were no changes 
in the variance-covariance matrix of these assets and their expected returns.   Obviously, in the 
real world, additional changes can occur at the same time as the change in the weights. 
However, to keep the model mathematically tractable, it is necessary to make same simplifying 
assumptions that will enable us to focus on the impact of the variables of interest.  
In this case, as we wish to investigate the impact of the decline of the banking sector on the 
betas of the other sectors, we assume that in our model: (i) there are just to sectors: banking 
(B) and non-banking (A), (ii) the sectors are positively correlated, (iii) the banking beta before 
the change in the weights is greater than one, (iv) the variance-covariance matrix of the banking 
and non-banking sectors does not change.  
It is important to note that limiting attention to a two sector market is not unreasonable.  Let us 
use N to denote the number of sectors (not individual assets). Let us use subscript B for one of 
these sectors (namely, the banking sector), and denote the sum of weights of the other N-1 
sectors as Aw , i.e., A
1N
1i
i ww 


. Then, 1ww BA  , and if RA is defined as  



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1
N
i
i
A
i
AA R
w
w
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

. This however means that 1βwβw BBAA   
where 
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where 2A  denotes the variance of sector A  and B A,cov denotes the covariance between 
sectors A and B.  
 
It is clear that 
Aw enters (1) in a non-linear way, and also that the sign of the first derivative of 
Aβ with respect to Aw depends on the sign of the numerator (the denominator will always be 
positive) which has a polynomial form. Moreover, whether Aβ increases or decreases will be 
determined by the quadratic polynomial and, in particular, it is important whether  2A  is greater 
or smaller than BA,  (details of the calculations are in Appendix 1). Figure 1 illustrates these 
two possibilities. In Panel A the position of the sectoral betas are plotted for 
0.11cov0.36,σ0.09,σ A.B
2
B
2
A  , which correspond to the values observed on the US 
market for the utilities sector (A) and the banking sector (B) over the period of the sample. The 
covariance of 0.11 corresponds to a correlation of 60% between the two sectors, which is also 
calculated from the data.  Panel B shows a more hypothetical situation, when the two sectors 
have zero correlation while the variances are the same as those used in Panel A.  
These examples given in Figure 1 suggest a particular relationship. Namely, hold the variance-
covariance matrix constant and take any proportion of the stock market for A, say 
'
Aw , such 
that 
'
Aβ <1, then Aβ  is greater than 
'
Aβ for all Aw > 
'
Aw . This is a general feature, as is given 
in Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 
If 
22
BA   , 0cov , BA  and 
22 , BA  , BA,cov remain constant as Aw  changes, then, for any 
'
Aw  
such that 1)(wβ 'AA  , )(wβ)(wβ AA
'
AA  for every 
'
AA ww  . 
 
The formal proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix 1. Note Proposition 1 does not 
imply that A’s beta is always increasing as A’s proportion of the market increases (Panel B of 
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Figure 1 shows this is not the case). However, it does imply that if for a given 'Aw , 
'
Aβ <1, then 
Aβ must be higher whenever A’s proportion of the market is higher.  
Of course, when there is a decline in the proportion of a particular asset in the market it is 
unlikely that the other things will remain constant but it is worth noting, however, that this does 
not have to be the case. For example, the increase in the proportion of A in the market may 
arise because a proportion of asset B is simply taken off the market and in such a case it may 
be possible for the variance-covariance matrix to be unaffected. However, particularly in the 
case of a major financial crisis, we can expect that the effect we document formally in 
Proposition 1 will only be part of a more general crisis impact. Even so, it may still be possible 
to identify such an effect in the data.  
Given the simplicity of the CAPM assumptions (e.g., normality of returns) and numerous issues 
with the empirical testing of its validity, additional factors that attempt to better isolate 
idiosyncratic effects from those that can be attributed to various market forces have been long 
debated in the literature (e.g., Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Carhart, 1997; Chung et al., 
2006; Fama and French, 1992, 1993). The Fama-French factors (Fama and French, 1992,1993) 
are among most popular ones, however, these factors are not without criticism either (e.g., 
Asness and Frazzini, 2013; Bartholdy and Peare, 2005, Connor et al., 2015). These factors do 
not carry similar properties of the CAPM betas and most importantly for our purposes, the 
coefficients associated with the Fama-French factors do not sum to one or any other constant, 
so the impact we identify will be restricted to the market risk factor.  
Section 3 discusses the relevant literature in relation to the relevant countries and sectors during 
the crisis but here we discuss the transmission mechanism and effect of the crisis on risk more 
generally. There are many paper addressing the contagion across markets, both across global 
stock markets and from the financial sector to the real sector. Looking at stock markets, 
Bartram and Bodnar (2009) address the timing and scale of value destruction and document on 
average a 40% decline across a broad array of stock markets, identifying the period mid-
September to end October 2008 as the core period of contagion. Mishkin (2011) also 
documents the speed of the development of the financial crisis based around Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, the AIG collapse and the struggle to get the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
approved by Congress. Covitz et al. (2013) document that runs in asset-backed commercial 
paper market spread rapidly from August 2007. Karanasos et al. (2014) find increased 
contagion across markets during the financial crisis. Addressing banking stocks particularly, 
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Dias and Ramos (2014) undertake a clustering analysis of the world banking sector (across 40 
countries) in the crisis and find periods of intense contagion. They also find almost all European 
countries are placed together in a group that also includes those countries whose banking 
sectors that experienced the most severe crisis.  Gandhi and Lustic (2015) find large banks have 
lower risk adjusted returns than smaller banks, notably in the period 2002 to 2007 (probably 
indicating a ‘too big to fail’ overvaluation of large banks during this period). Horta et al. (2014) 
show a significant increase in the correlation of local Hurst exponents across eight G12 
countries in the crisis which indicates financial contagion across these markets.  
Turning to broader impact, Bekaert et al. (2014) use a factor model to predict crisis returns on 
415 country-industry portfolios and use factor loadings and residual correlations to indicate 
contagion and determine the process of transmission. They argue that contagion effects from 
the US and global financial sector are small compared to contagion effects from domestic 
markets to the individual portfolios.  Duchin et al. (2010) find that corporate investment 
declines significantly following the onset of the financial crisis, the effects being greatest for 
firms that have low cash reserves or high short term debt. Similarly, Campello et al. (2010) 
using survey evidence from Chef Financial Officers in the US, Europe and Asia found 
significant declines in corporate spending plans following the crisis and found the planned cuts 
were deeper for credit constrained firms.   
In terms of transmission mechanisms, Graham and Harvey (2010) show, using evidence 
derived from surveys of chief financial officers, that the level of disagreement over what 
respondents believed the appropriate equity risk premium to be increased significantly during 
the crisis and that the average view of the equity risk premium level also grew markedly. 
Derrien and Kecskés (2013) address the real impact of a particular financial shock, the 
reduction in analyst coverage arising from broker closures and mergers, and find investment 
and financing of firms falls by approximately 2% for each unit drop in the number of analysts 
covering the firm. Keraney and Poti (2008) find that market and idiosyncratic volatility in 
European stocks is pro-cyclical, rising during times of low market risk. Campbell et al. (2011) 
find distressed stocks have variable returns and market betas and tend to underperform safe 
stocks by more in times of high market volatility. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) find sectors that 
depend more on external finance are hit hardest during crises. Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) find 
that financing constraints of small firms was one of the big drivers of unemployment during 
the 2007-2009 crisis. Laeven and Valencia (2013b) find that financially dependent firms 
benefit most from bank recapitalisation, indicating that bank weakness hits financially 
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dependent firms hardest. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that new lending to large 
borrowers fell by 47% during the 4th quarter of 2008 compared to second quarter of 2007 and 
that lending for real investment fell by 14%. Claessens et al. (2012) using company data from 
42 countries found that firms with greater sensitivity to trade developments were most affected 
by the financial crisis.  See also Allen et al. (2009), Cerra and Saxena (2008), Laeven and 
Valencia (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and Antony and 
Broer (2010) for a survey. 
A particular feature of the literature is that the transmission of the financial shock to output and 
stock values of the real sector appears to arise through the reduction in loans and this is 
particularly an issue for firms that are constrained. This does not directly explain why funding 
is harder to come by. One explanation is that banks are themselves constrained but this paper 
offers an alternative explanation, namely that the change in the composition of the stock market 
suggests that low risk sectors require a higher return during the crisis.  
 
3. Countries and sectors  
 
In this section we discuss in more detail the justification for the choice of the countries used in 
the analysis, and the focus on the industrials and utilities sectors.   
 
3.1. The countries   
The global financial crisis of 2007 initially developed in the US, although it has had enormous 
impact on the financial sector of almost all developed countries (Baur, 2012). Given the central 
role of the US in the financial crisis and wide range of available data, we begin our analysis by 
focusing on potential composition effects in the US, using daily returns of the utility, industrials 
and banking sector indexes constructed using data from AMEX, NASDAY and NYSE.  
However, given that the impact of the financial crisis was not uniform across countries, we 
seek to utilize this fact by comparing the effects across a series of countries with different 
severities of the crisis. A good measure of the extent of the differences can be gauged by 
looking at the group of 12 countries, G12 (actually 13 as a result of Switzerland’s membership), 
since this is a group of industrially advanced countries whose central banks co-operate to 
regulate international finance. As indicated in the introduction, the scale of the impact of the 
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financial crisis in these countries is classified in the Systemic Crisis Data Bank as a major 
systemic banking crisis in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the US, as 
‘marginal’ in France, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland, and absent, in Australia, Canada, Japan, 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2013a). We use this exogenous metric (i.e., classification of the 
countries into these with (i) major systemic crisis, (ii) marginal and (iii) no systemic crisis) as 
an indicator of the scale of impact of the financial crisis in a country. The basic conjecture is 
that the greater the scale of the crisis, then the greater should be the composition effects.  Within 
the G12 group, there were also significant differences in government responses. For example, 
the US, the UK and the Netherlands engaged in significant nationalisation whereas this was 
often comparatively or sometimes totally absent in other countries, and by 2012 within the 
G12, the average cost of asset purchases and guarantees was 12% of GDP in the countries with 
major systemic crisis (Belgium 7.7%, Germany 17.2%, Netherlands 3.3%, Spain 1.8%, UK 
30.8%, and US 13%) and 1.75% of GDP for the countries categorised as marginal (France 
0.3%, Italy 0%, Sweden 0%, and Switzerland 6.7%).3  
 
3.2. The sectors 
The banking sector was at the heart of the financial crisis and is at the centre of our analysis. 
We have argued that the dramatic changes in the banking, and broader financial sectors, could 
lead to spill-over effects onto other sectors, and given that we utilise differences in the scale of 
systemic crisis across the countries, we begin with a brief discussion of the banking sector in 
our sample. The notion of, what we call, a composition effect is that changes in market share 
of one part of the market are very likely to spill-over to the betas of other sectors, as a result of 
the overall constraint, and thus we may observe a relationship between the severity of the 
systemic crisis and the betas of other sectors. Figure 2 provides data on how the banking 
sector’s shares of the stock markets have differed during the crisis relative to the pre-crisis 
period. For each country we calculate the average market share of the banking sector during 
the crisis to the equivalent average share over the period of the same length before the crisis 
(monthly observations are used).   We adopt two alternative dates as the relevant markers for 
the start of the crisis. These are August 2007 and September 2008 (see below, Section 3.3, for 
discussion). Thus, for each country, the left hand bar shows the ratios using August 2007 as 
                                                             
3 Laeven and Valencia (2013a). 
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the start of the financial crisis and the right hand bar relates to September 2008 as the start of 
the financial crisis. 
 
*********************** insert Figure 2 here *********************** 
 
There is significant disparity across countries. The Netherlands provides the most dramatic 
change with the banking sector’s share of the stock market during the crisis averaging about 
only 3.9% of the pre-crisis figure.  This dramatic effect was heavily due to the nationalisation 
programme that made the government owner of ABN AMRO, ASR, and SNS REALL, 
although the government has a stated commitment to return the companies to the market. At 
the other extreme, Australia and Canada, both having avoided a systemic crisis, have seen 
noticeable increases in the share of the banking sector rather than falls. The countries in Figure 
2 are grouped according to the three categories of systemic crisis, the first three countries 
having no systemic crisis, the next having marginal systemic crisis and the final six are those 
countries which had a major systemic crisis. There is a clear relationship between the categories 
and the changes in market share. Australia, Canada and Japan have an average ratio of 1.03, 
those countries with marginal systemic crisis have an average of 0.82 and those with major 
systemic crisis the average market share of the banking sector during the crisis is half of the 
pre-crisis share, 50.8 (for these numbers August 2007 is used as the start of the financial crisis).  
Spain and Sweden are outliers from their groups (both having ratios of almost 1 relative to 
averages of 0.76 and 0.43 for the other countries in the marginal systemic crisis and major 
systemic crisis groups). The fact that the mean market share of Spain’s banking sector during 
the crisis is almost as high as its pre-crisis level may be a reflection of several factors (the 
systemic crisis in Spain arose in 2011 (compared to 2008 in Belgium, Netherlands, UK and US 
and 2009 in Germany (see also Royo, 2013)), the fact that the pre-crisis Spanish debt to income 
ratio was low, there has been no nationalisation of the Spanish banks, Spain received enormous 
EU support, and the non-banking sector in Spain has been hit comparatively harder than in the 
other countries that have experienced a major systemic crisis). As noted, Sweden has a higher 
ratio than the other countries in the marginal systemic crisis group. The reason probably lies in 
the fact that Sweden went through a banking crisis in 1991-1992 that was similar in many 
respects to the subprime crisis that precipitated the global financial crisis (Drees and 
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Pazarbasioglu, 1998; Sandal, 2004).  Hence there was significant intervention and restructuring 
in Sweden before the current crisis. Indeed Sweden’s response to the 1991-1992 crisis has been 
held as a model for the current crisis (See Krugman, 2008; Jonung, 2009). Following on from 
that crisis Swedish banks were profitable and had substantial buffers following a number of 
good years. As a result of the previous crisis they did granted loans as hastily as the banks in 
the United States and they have not been exposed to any great extent to the type of financial 
products that have been part of the problem.4 Thus in many regards Sweden is an outlier with 
regard to the position of its banking sector both pre- and during the crisis. 
In the paper we analyse the change in risk of the industrial sector and the utility sector. We 
address the utility sector because there is strong anecdotal evidence that this sector have been 
particularly attractive in the crisis. Utility infrastructure companies are typically considered 
defensive stocks but there is evidence that utilities have been perceived as even safer homes 
for investment during the period of heightened uncertainty arising from the recent financial 
crisis. There are obvious reasons why this may be the case. For example, the prices and/or the 
returns for a large proportion of the companies are regulated and hence revenues are somewhat 
protected during periods of high business risk. Furthermore, the outputs are more essential to 
consumers and the economy than other sectors so demand is far less volatile even for those 
companies that are not directly regulated.  
Utility industries around the world have been for several years the focus of major investment 
programmes. The most obvious example is probably the energy sector where in most western 
economies traditional, carbon heavy generation capacity is being replaced with renewable 
generation (wind, solar, nuclear, biomass) on a large scale. This new generation is typically 
sited away from traditional generation hence, in addition to cost of the new generation, the 
transmission systems require billions of dollars of additional investment to upgrade and extend 
national transmission systems. IT developments in modern smart networks also call for large-
scale upgrades to network systems. Other sectors, such as transport, similarly require massive 
infrastructure inputs. Despite the financial crisis, these sectors have found it relatively easy to 
find funding. For instance, across different sectors Afonja (2012), Cambridge Economic Policy 
Associates (2014), Hansen (2010), Ofgem (2013) and PWC (2013) emphasise that funding has 
been robust at attractive rates. Moreover, Maung and Mehrota (2010) show that utilities credit 
ratings have been more robust than other sectors during the crisis.  
                                                             
4 Speech by Svante Öberg, Deputy Governor of Riksbank (Swedish Central Bank), in 2009. 
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The attraction of utilities during the financial crisis also appears to hold when one looks at 
private equity. The strategy of Berkshire Hathaway through the crisis is a classic example of 
this point. Berkshire Hathaway (2008) emphasised the importance of utility businesses to the 
company’s strategy looking forward. Between 2009 and 2013, Berkshire Hathaway’s revenue 
from railroad, utilities and energy business increased from $11,434bn to $73,757bn (Berkshire 
Hathaway, 2013), mostly funded by acquisitions. Recently, Charles Munger, Berkshire 
Hathaway’s Vice Chairman, suggested that Berkshire Hathaway will soon be the biggest 
utilities business in the US (Wall Street Journal, 2014). The perception of utilities as being 
particularly low risk in the financial crisis should indicate that a fall in market risk relative to 
the pre-crisis level should be observed, unless some other factor acts to offset this. Hence 
failure to observe a relatively uniform decline in market risk for utilities could be taken as 
providing some evidence of an offsetting composition effect.  
As indicated in the introduction, industrials have not had a favoured ‘halo effect’, and we 
therefore assume that general industrial stocks are far more likely to experience a stock market 
composition effect rather than be seen as a safe haven in the crisis. So when the financial market 
declines as a share of the stock market we conjecture that industrials will face a composition 
effect leading to upward pressure on its stock market risk measure. Furthermore, we conjecture 
that those countries that suffered the greater systemic crisis are more likely to observe an 
increase in the risk measures of industrials compared to their pre-crisis levels.  
 
4. Data  
 
As discussed above, testing for our hypotheses is conducted at two levels. First, the case of the 
US market is studied, and then the analysis of international markets is performed. Below we 
describe the samples created for the US and the G12 countries. 
 
4.1 The US sample 
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To analyse the US market we use time series collected from the webpages of Professor Kenneth 
French5 and DataStream, to which we refer to as KF-Data and DS-Data respectively.  
The KF-Data provide time series of daily returns on a wide range of industry indexes, excess 
return on the market, risk free rate of return and returns on the SML, HML, RMW and CMA 
factors. The industry indexes based on 49 Compustat SIC classifications are selected for the 
study because this is the most detailed classification that is available. It provides returns for the 
utilities and the banking sectors which we refer to as RU49 and RB49 respectively. However, the 
industrials index needs to be calculated. 6 Following the specification of the DS Industrials 
Index (ICB Code 2000) we calculate the returns on the KF industrials index using returns on 
the following indexes: Construction materials, Machinery, Electrical Equipment, Automobile 
and trucks, Aircraft, Shipbuilding and railroad equipment, Defense, Business services, 
Measuring and control equipment, Business supplies, Shipping containers, and Transportation. 
We equally weight these returns and refer to the returns of this newly created industrials index 
as RI49. 
However, given that the industrials sector index we created may be biased towards particular 
sectors (e.g., it may overweigh components with small weights) we also construct an alternative 
control sample. Grout and Zalewska (2006), when analysing the effect of proposed changes in 
regulation of utilities on the market risk of UK utilities, constructed a sample of ‘old-economy’ 
stocks that could be expected to respond in a similar way to changes in general market 
conditions save for the proposed changes in regulation. Following this approach, a comparator 
index is calculated as the equally weighted index of the Agriculture, Food products, Candy and 
soda, Beer and liquor, Tobacco products, Apparel, Textiles, Wholesale, Retail, Restaurants, 
hotels and motels indexes and the indexes included in the construction of the industrials index. 
The returns on this control index are referred to as RC49. 
Using the KF-Data has two advantages. First, it provides indexes representative for the whole 
US economy, as the stocks used to construct indexes are traded on NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ. Second, the SML, HML, RMW and CMA factors are constructed using the same 
methodology as the other indexes. There are, however, three issues that need to be addressed 
when dealing with this data. First, as discussed above, the KF-Data do not provide an industrial 
index for the economy and construction of the equally weighted index may create a bias 
                                                             
5 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research  
6 There are 5, 10, 12, 17, 30, 38, 48, and 49 industry classifications available. 
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towards components with small weights. Second, there are no indexes for other counties 
constructed using the same methodology. Third, using several indexes defined on overlapping 
subsets of the same set of stocks causes there are potential issues with multicollinearity.  
To deal with the first two issues we also use US industry indexes provided by DataStream. To 
check the robustness of our findings we collected S&P1500 indexes and DS-calculated indexes. 
The S&P1500 indexes are collected because, (i) there is a ‘ready-calculated’ industrials index, 
and (ii) in addition to the returns on the utilities index, returns on four sub-indexes are also 
available. In particular, there are indexes for electricity utilities, gas utilities, water utilities and 
multi-utilities. The DS calculated indexes, on the other hand, do not have detailed sub-indexes 
for the utilities sector but they are calculated for many countries providing a comparable sample 
for the G12 analysis. Both sources provide indexes for the banking sector which we also 
collected and use in the analysis. For all these indexes we calculate log-returns and denote as 
RSP with an additional superscript to indicate a sector (B for banking, I for industrials, etc.).   
The issue with potential multicollinearity requires a more detailed discussion and will be 
addressed in Section 4 when we discuss the US sample results.  
The sample starts on 1 January 1996 and ends on 31 July 2014. The beginning of the sample is 
dictated by the data availability. The KF-Data series go back to July 1926 and end on 31 July 
2014 (at the time of the sample collection), but the other time series are much shorter. The 
S&P1500 time series start on 3 February 2004, and some DS-calculated time series start at 
various points through 1995.  
To keep the sample as long and as representative as possible we start the KF-Data and DS-
calculated time series on 1 January 1996 and end on 31 July 2014.  The S&P1500 time series 
start on 3 February 2004 and end on 31 July 2014. We do not truncate all the time series to 
2004 to maintain the sample long enough to have a good overview of the changes that occurred 
after 2007.  
Basic summary statistics of the returns on the KF and S&P1500 indexes are presented in Table 
1. The statistics for the log-returns on the DS-calculated indexes are presented in the next 
section, i.e., together with the statistics for the other G12 countries.  
 
******************** insert Table 1 here ************************ 
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4.2. The G12 sample 
To further understand the analysed phenomena we provide an international comparison of the 
changes in the market risk of the utilities, the industrials and the banking sectors over the period 
1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014. The choice of countries was partly dictated by data availability, 
i.e., information about stock market returns of the industrials and the utilities sector was 
available for long enough, but also a range of countries’ experiences since 2007. Ideally, we 
targeted to construct a sample of countries that experienced severe economic and stock market 
repercussions during the financial crisis, and countries that did not seem to be affected by the 
collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the US.  
The attention has been focused on the G12, a group of 13 highly industrial countries whose 
central banks co-operate to regulate international finance. As mentioned in Section 2.2, 
according to Laeven and Valencia (2013a) the G12 countries can be divided into three groups 
depending on the severity of the systemic problems in their banking sectors, those which 
experienced a major systemic banking crisis (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the 
UK, and the US), those with a ‘marginal’ systemic banking crisis (France, Italy, Sweden and 
Switzerland), and those without it (Australia, Canada, Japan).  
We collected the DS-calculated stock market and the banking sector indexes for all the 13 
countries. However, the utilities index was not available for Sweden and the Dutch one stopped 
being calculated on 24 February 2004. Therefore, changes in the market risk of the utilities 
sectors are analysed for 11 countries only. Moreover, there are also some issues with the DS 
General Industrials indexes. The French index is available from 29 January 1999 and there are 
no General Industrials indexes for Spain and Sweden. In the case of these three countries the 
DS-calculated Industrials indexes use used. These indexes are much broader, and may not be 
directly comparable with the General Industrials index, but they are available for the whole 
period of interest and are the best proxy that we have.    All the time series (except those for 
France) are collected for the 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014 period. The summary statistics of 
the log-returns on market, banking, industrials and utilities indexes are presented in Table 2.  
 
******************** insert Table 2 here ******************** 
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4.3 Methodology  
To test for the existence of the composition effect time dummies are needed to observe the 
potential impact of the financial crisis on market risk across sectors and across countries.  
Although it is common to treat 2007 as the starting year of the financial crisis, it is not 
altogether clear which exact date is to be singled out. Moreover, the financial crisis did not start 
in all countries at the same time. While in the US and the UK the financial crisis started in 
2007, other countries started to experience it in 2008 (Laeven and Valencia, 2013a). We tie the 
start of the financial crisis dummies to specific market events. In particular, we pick two 
specific dates to define two time dummies. The first date is 9 August 2007, i.e., the day when 
BNP Paribas announced that it was ceasing activities in three large hedge funds specialising in 
US mortgage market. This was probably the first point in time that it was stated openly that 
many trillions of dollars of derivatives were likely to be worth far less than was assumed at the 
time. The second date is 15 September 2008, i.e., the day Lehman Brothers went bankrupt.  
We use two dummies to capture the time change in risk measures. Dummy D07 is defined as 1 
from 9 August 2007 till 31 July 2014 (the end of the sample) and zero otherwise, and Dummy 
D08 is defined as 1 from 15 September 2008 till 31 July 2014, and zero otherwise.  
When testing for the composition effect on US data (Section 4) we only use D07. This is because 
the financial crisis started in the US in 2007 (Laeven and Valencia, 2013a). In the regressions 
for the G12 countries both dummies are used. This is because in all these countries, but the US 
and the UK, the financial crisis started in 2008. As the month of the beginning of the financial 
crisis for the individual countries are hard to be determined we use both D07 and D08 to test the 
robustness of our findings. The regressions with the D08 dummy are presented in Appendix 2. 
The Fama-French 3-Factor and 5-Factor CAPM specifications, i.e.,   
tt07Dr07Dt
tfree,tM,07Dtfree,tM,07Dt
εHMLDδδHMLSMBDγγSMB
 )R(RDβ)Rβ(RDααR


                      (2) 
and  
tt07Drt07Drt07Dr
07Dttfree,tM,07Dtfree,tM,07Dt
εCMADCMARMWDRMWHMLDδδHML
SMBDγγSMB )R(RDβ)Rβ(RDααR



   (3) 
respectively, as well as a simple market CAPM specification 
ttM,07DtM,07Dt ε RDββRDααR                                (4) 
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are used with Rt denoting daily excess returns  (Eqs. (2) and (3)) or returns (Eq. (4)) on 
individual  indexes (utilities, industrials, banking and control index)  or differences between 
returns on indexes of utilities sector and returns on indexes of industrials or of the control 
sample. For the G12 countries we used Eq. (4) specification only.7 
Tables 1 and 2 clearly show that time series of returns are far from normally distributed. To 
deal with the potential bias in the estimated coefficients and standard errors a GARCH (p,q) 
specification of the variance is applied. The magnitude of p and q was determined for each 
individual regression based on the correlation tests of squared standardised residuals, Durbin-
Watson statistics and Schwartz criterion. As the GARCH effects are not of main interest they 
are presented in Appendix 2.   
At this point a few words are necessary to explain our choice of using a univariate GARCH 
model specification.  Since Engle and Sheppard (2001) showed that an estimation of a 
multivariate DCC model can be significantly simplified DCC models gained significantly on 
popularity. The estimations we provide in the paper are in fact the first step for the DCC models 
calculations. The next step would be to utilise the residuals of the univariate GARCH to 
estimate conditional correlations. This would however require strong assumptions about the 
joint distribution of the standardised residuals (Bollerslev et al., 1988; Bauwens et al., 2006).  
Each country in our sample experiences of the financial crisis were different. It is not only that 
market turbulences happened at slightly different times, but also their local markets, including 
effects on the banking sector, utilities, and industrials were different as the result of differences 
in fundamental organisation, structures, regulatory regimes and approaches of the local 
authorities to weakening economies and confidence. Therefore, the fundamental assumption of 
the DCC models that conditional correlations must obey the same dynamics is most likely 
unrealistic.8   
One of the fundamental assumptions of the multivariate GARCH model is that all investors 
have the same expectations about mean, variances and covariances of returns. This may not be 
true across countries, and especially during the financial crisis. Numerous anecdotal evidence 
                                                             
7 We also controlled for potential changes in market risk during the dotcom bubble but this had no impact on the 
results and is not reported. 
8 It is commonly accepted that it is sufficient to specify conditional variances of financial time series as 
GARCH(1,1). However, as it is shown in Appendix 2, more lags in the GARCH specifications were needed for 
nearly all time series we consider. They vary between the commonly used GARCH(1,1)  and GARCH(3,2).  
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suggests that confidence in the success of the local policymakers in dealing with the weakening 
situation was very different (e.g., while the Greek electorate seemed to put lots of trust in 
solutions proposed by Syriza, other countries remained sceptical about them). Finally, to 
maintain comparability of regressions across the samples (i.e., the KF-Data, DS-Data and G12 
sample), it seems reasonable to use the same method of estimation across the samples.  
 
 
5. US results 
 
Before we discuss the results a few words about the sample are needed. Any multivariate model 
is potentially exposed to multicollinearity. The Fama-French factors have been constructed by 
regrouping a set of stocks and it can be expected that there are some potential interdependencies 
among the factors and the market index. These interdependencies may be time varying and 
more importantly, may intensify during particular market conditions. Table 3 shows three sets 
of correlations between the excess returns on the market and the four Fama-French factors for 
the whole period (panel A), for the 1 January 1996 – 8 August 2007 period (panel B), and for 
the 9 August 2007 – 31 July 2014 period (panel C).  
 
****************** insert Table 3 here ************ 
 
The Panel A correlations are not particularly high except for the one estimated for the HML 
and CMA that exceeds 50%. However, the pre-financial crisis correlations show much higher 
levels: HML correlates with CMA at 70.6%, HML is also highly correlated with the market 
excess returns (-63.9%) and RMW (44.8%). Moreover, RMW correlates at -45% with SML 
and the market excess returns correlate with CMA at -47.7%. The post 9 August 2007 
correlations are lower, which probably reflects significant changes in the compositions of the 
factors (e.g., banks may have become smaller, and reduced their B/M ratios) but still three 
correlation coefficients are around 50% (HML v. RMW, RM-Rfree v. HML and RM –Rfree v. 
RMV).  
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One can expect therefore that putting all these variables and their interactions with the time 
dummy in one regression specification may create issues with multicollinearity. Table 4 
presents tolerance (1-R2 or 1/VIF) for the independent variables of Eqs. (2) and (3). The 
tolerance statistics are much higher when the three rather than five factors are used. In 
particular, the HML’s tolerance is low for the five-factor specification. It shows that only 20% 
of the variable variance is independent of the other variables. This suggests that the 3-Factor 
model is potentially more reliable than the five-factor model for the problem at hand. Given 
that we are interested in the effects of the financial crisis on the CAPM beta only, we do not 
further investigate the best way to estimate the 5-factor model coefficients, especially that the 
rest of the paper will use the classic-CAPM one-factor specification.  
 
*********************** insert Table 4   here ***************** 
 
Table 5 shows regression results for the Fama-French 3-Factor model and Table 6 shows the 
regression results for the Fama-French 5-Factor model as discussed in Section 4.3.  The R2 are 
high, but this is not surprising given the discussion above.  
The first column of Tables 5 and 6 show that the beta coefficients estimated for the industrials 
index increased during the financial crisis. The increase is statistically significant at 1%. 
Moreover the statistically significant increase is observed for the SMB, RWM and CMA factor 
and statistically significant decrease is obtained for the HML factor. The increase of the beta 
coefficient is consistent with our hypothesis. In addition, the same effects (in the size of 
statistical significance and direction of change except for SMB in the five-factor specification) 
are observed for the control index constructed to mimic old-economy stocks. This supports the 
expectation that the control index has similar properties to the industrials index although 
consists of a much broader asset class. The next two columns show the coefficients estimated 
for the banking sector (RB49 – Rfree) and the utilities sector (RU49 – Rfree). They show that the 
beta of the banking sector increased (however, not significant for the five-factor specification) 
and the beta of utilities declined during the financial crisis.  
The last two columns of Tables 5 and 6 confirm our expectations that the utilities sector, in 
general, is less risky than the industrials and the old-economy stocks, and that the difference in 
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the market risk of the industrials index and of the control index increased statistically 
significantly during the financial crisis.  
 
********************** insert Table 5 here ********************* 
********************** insert Table 6 here ********************* 
 
The results obtained for S&P1500 indexes confirm these findings. Tables 7 and 8 show the 
regression results obtained for the level and differences specifications, respectively, obtained 
for S&P1500 indexes. Table 7 confirms that the market risk of the banking and of the 
industrials sectors increased statistically significantly during the financial crisis. It is also clear 
that the risk of utilities decreased. A statistically significant decline is obtained for the 
S&P1500 utilities index and all its sub-indexes except for the gas utilities which does not show 
a statistically significant change in the beta coefficient. 
 
********************** insert Table 7 here ********************* 
 
Table 8 documents the relative changes in the market risk of the utility companies. It shows 
the estimates of the coefficients when the returns on the utilities index, or its sub-indexes, minus 
returns on the industrials index are used as the dependent variable. All the interactive effects 
of the slope coefficient are statistically significantly negative at 1% and 5%. The decline in the 
coefficient is also substantial. Except for the gas utilities, the gap between the market risk of 
the utilities and of the industrials, at least, doubled during the financial crisis.  
   
 ********************** insert Table 8 here ********************* 
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All in all the above results show that during the financial crisis the market risk of the industrials 
sector increased, while it decreased for the utilities sector. This resulted in a statistically 
significantly wider gap between the market risks of these two sectors.  
 
 
5. G12 sample 
 
The primary objective of this section is to undertake an international comparison of the change 
in the pattern of the industrials and utilities beta coefficients across the G12 countries.  
Table 9 shows the results of regressions across the 13 countries for industrials (Panel A) and 
banks (Panel B) using D07 to capture the change in beta during the crisis period.  Looking at 
industrials first, the change in the beta within the crisis period from the pre-crisis level, the 
coefficient estimates for RmxD07 are statistically significant at 1% for all of the countries with 
the exception of Switzerland, significant at 5%, and Canada, where the coefficient is not 
significant. For most countries there is an increase in the beta of industrials during the crisis 
but Australia, Canada and Italy show a decline in the beta of industrials during the crisis.  
 
**********************  insert Table 9 here ********************* 
 
Before discussing the differences in the betas of industrials across the countries, it is helpful 
first to look at the beta of the banking sector in these countries. Panel B shows the beta of the 
banking sector before 2007, the column marked RM, and the change in the beta during the crisis, 
the column marked RMxD07. This shows that before the crisis the betas of the banking sector 
were greater than one in most countries, with Australia, Canada and Italy, again being the 
exception. The betas of the banking sector increased during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis 
levels for all countries except Canada (the coefficient is positive although not statistically 
significant) and the Netherlands for which the beta halved during the financial crisis (the 
estimates are statistically significant at 1%).  
24 
 
If the change in the beta of industrials can in part be explained by the composition effects 
arising from the decline of the banking sector during the financial crisis then on average we 
would expect that the effect would be more pronounced the more severe the country’s banking 
crisis and the higher the beta of the country’s banking index. Figure 3 helps to see whether the 
regressions shown in Table 9 suggest that there is any evidence of such a relationship. The 
vertical axis in Figure 3 measures the increase in risk of industrials compared to the pre-crisis 
levels. The horizontal axis measures the beta of the banking sector before the crisis, and the 
vertical axis is drawn through one.  All 13 countries are plotted in this space.  
 
*********************   insert Figure 3 here ****************** 
 
The first point to note is that there are no countries except Sweden in either the upper left or 
lower right quadrant. Put another way, save for Sweden there are no countries with pre-crisis 
beta of the banking sector above one that did not have an increase in the beta of industrials 
during the crisis and no country that had a fall in the beta of industrials which did not have the 
pre-crisis level of risk of the banking index less than one. Furthermore, there is a clear positive 
correlation in the graph. In Figure 3 the countries with major systemic banking crisis are 
marked by triangles, those with marginal systemic banking crisis are marked by diamonds and 
those with no systemic banking crisis are marked by circles. The figure shows clearly that the 
six countries that experienced a major systemic banking crisis are amongst the seven countries 
with the biggest increase in betas of industrials (Sweden again be the exception). Two of the 
four countries that had a marginal systemic banking crisis have small but positive increases in 
the beta of industrials and two of the three where there was no systemic banking crisis 
experienced small falls in the beta of industrials.9  
                                                             
9 It is interesting to note that in recent years it is being claimed that both Australia and Canada engaged in 
secretive bailouts, well hidden from the public eye. McDonald (2012) argues that secretive bailouts took place 
in Canada and similar stories have been leaked in Australia (http://www.moneymorning.com.au/20101203/nab-
and-westpacs-secret-bailout-revealed.html)  
.  
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The presence of a composition effect will be somewhat mitigated by a large increase in risk of 
the banking sector. However, as Table 9 shows, although in general there is an increase in risk 
in the banking sector there is no systematic relationship between increases in risk and the 
severity of the banking crisis. For example, the two largest increases in risk of the banking 
sector occur in countries with only marginal systemic banking crisis (France and Italy). 
Furthermore, the biggest fall in the risk of the banking sector occurred in a country classified 
as having a major systemic crisis (Netherlands). The large decline in risk in the Netherlands 
banking sector may in part be caused by the large-scale nationalization that took place. Note 
that the Netherlands also experienced the biggest increase in risk of industrials and one might 
conjecture that part of the impact arose because of the fall in the risk of the banking sector.  
Overall, not only do we observe the increase in the beta of industrials as anticipated but in 
general the scale of change seems to fit the underlying notion that the composition effect will 
be greatest where the crisis has been most severe and where pre-crisis banking index betas were 
highest.  
The economic impact of these changes in the industrial sector will depend whether investors 
adjust their view of the equity risk premium as a result of composition changes. This would 
require a downward revision of the equity risk premium whereas all the evidence points to an 
uplift (e.g., Graham and Harvey (2010)) in the perceived equity risk premium. We can obtain 
some view of the potential impact on funding for industrials by taking the increases in industrial 
betas in Table 9 and, for given equity risk premia, identifying how much greater is the required 
return to compensate for the increase in risk. Here we consider three equity risk premia: the 
best estimates of Campbell and Thompson (2008) and Goyal and Welch (2008), 3.1% and 
14.5% respectively, and the average (5.7%) drawn across 20 reputable published studies 
(including Campbell and Thompson (2008) and Goyal and Welch (2008)) reported by Duarte 
and Rosa (2015). For the six countries that suffered major systemic crisis the increase in 
required return for the industrial sector would be (in the order Campbell and Thompson (2008) 
followed by Goyal and Welch (2008)) then Duarte and Rosa (2015)): Belgium 0.78%, 3.6%, 
and 1.4%; Germany 1.3%, 6.1% and 2.4%; the Netherlands 1.95%, 9.1%, and 3.6%; Spain 
0.6%, 2.7%, and 1%; UK 0.7%, 3.2%, and 1.3%; and the US 0.6%, 2.7%, and 1.1%.  
 
********************** insert Table 10 here ********************* 
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Table 10 shows the results of regressions across the eleven countries for utilities (Panel A) and 
utilities minus industrials (Panel B), using D07 to capture the change in beta during the crisis 
period.  Looking at utilities first, the change in the beta within the crisis period from the pre-
crisis level, RMxD07, is mixed across the countries. There are four countries where this fell, two 
of which had coefficients that are not significant. Furthermore, the fact that utilities have 
proved popular during the crisis and yet many display increases in betas during the crisis period 
lends weight to the presence of a composition effect. A far clearer picture emerges when one 
looks at the change in beta for utilities minus industrials. Here the coefficient on RMxD07 is 
significant at 1% in every country. This is strong evidence that utilities were comparatively 
favoured. These results suggest that there has been a flight to quality but one of the outcomes 
of the composition effect is that this is masked by changes in the composition of the market. 
However, recognition of the composition effect could potentially reduce the transmission of 
shocks from the financial sector to the real sector in the future. 
Figure 4 gives a histogram of the coefficients on RMxD07 in Panel B of Table 10 with the 
countries allocated into groups: major systemic banking crisis, which is placed first, marginal 
systemic banking crisis, placed next, or no systemic banking crisis, placed last (countries are 
placed alphabetically within group). The five countries with a major systemic banking crisis 
appear fairly consistent with every country having a negative coefficient. In contrast, the 
marginal systemic banking crisis and no systemic banking crisis appear far more randomly 
allocated, with both groups having positive and negative coefficients.  
 
*********************   insert Figure 4 here ****************** 
 
6. Conclusions     
 
The aim of this paper is to look at the effect of the financial crisis from an angle overlooked to 
date in the finance literature by investigating what we call composition effects, in particular, 
the impact of composition effects arising from the financial crisis. A composition effect is a 
change in the market risk of a sector that is caused not by a direct change in that sector but by 
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a change in another sector that affects the composition of the stock market. For example, 
assume that the proportion of a high market risk sector falls (rises). Other things being equal, 
since the market weighted sum of betas of the market portfolio has to be one, other sectors 
must have higher (lower) market risk measures if the overall constraint is to be achieved. The 
exact relationship is summarised in Proposition 1, which is proved in Appendix 1 of the paper.  
In the paper we investigate, in the US in detail and across G12 countries, the pre and during 
crisis market risk of banking, industrials and utilities. We find that the market risk of industrials 
is higher during the crisis than pre-crisis in the US and for most of the G12 countries. 
Furthermore, to the extent that this increase is caused by composition effects arising from the 
financial crisis, one would expect the increase in market risk for industrials larger the more 
severe the systemic banking crisis in a country. Across the G12 countries we find such a 
positive relationship between the increase in the market risk of industrials relative to pre-crisis 
levels and the pre-crisis market risk of the banking sector. The six G12 countries that 
experienced a severe systematic banking crisis are amongst the seven countries with the largest 
increases in the market risk for industrials (the exception is Sweden). We also find that, with 
the exception of Sweden, all countries with pre-crisis market risk of the banking sector above 
one experienced increases in market risk of industrials during the crisis and all countries with 
pre-crisis market risk of the banking sector below one experienced declines in market risk of 
industrials.  Note that, although the market risk of banks changed during the crisis, there is no 
such systematic relationship between the scale of the systemic crisis and the change in market 
risk of the banking sector.  
Turning to utilities, if, as we argue, utilities were seen as having particularly low market risk 
during the crisis, then in the absence of any composition effect we would expect their market 
risk to fall. However, we find that the market risk of the utility sector falls in some countries 
and rises in others with increases in market risk outnumbering the declines, which we interpret 
as additional support for a composition effect.  
One of the reasons that composition effects are important is that in the context of the financial 
crisis they have economically significant implications for the transmission mechanism from 
the financial to real economy and for investment strategies. In the paper we suggest that the 
collapse of the banking sector contributed to an increase in the market risk of industrials purely 
because of the composition effect, which would be in addition to any direct real impacts on the 
sector. Absent other changes, unless an investor also makes the consequent change in their 
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view of the required risk premium, the expected return of the comparatively lower market risk 
sector will appear to have a worse risk adjusted return than before, which may lead to 
difficulties in raising finance in the comparatively low market risk sector or underperformance 
of portfolios. We show, using the evidence from the regressions for the countries that faced a 
major systemic banking crisis, that these effects can be large, ranging from 0.6% increase in 
expected return from equity for the US using the best estimates for the equity risk premium of 
Campbell and Thompson (2008) and to 9.1% for the Netherlands using the best estimates of 
the equity risk premium of Goyal and Welch (2008).  Such an impact could have a significant 
chilling effect on industrials, in addition to the effect of other linkages arising through 
economic channels, which is not a reflection of true long term weakness in the sector. These 
results add to our understanding of the transmission of the financial shock to output and stock 
values of the real sector. The existing literature suggests the transmission arises through the 
reduction in loans and this is particularly an issue for firms that are constrained. This does not 
directly explain why funding is harder to come by for these particular sectors but our results 
indicate that such a change can arise naturally from the change in the composition of the stock 
market that occurred in the financial crisis.  
Finally, Grout and Zalewska (2006) document declines in the Kalman filter daily betas of old 
economy stocks during the dotcom bubble. However, the driver behind composition changes 
in the dot-com bubble was the ‘opposite’ of the driver behind the composition change arising 
in the financial crisis since during the dot-com bubble the composition changes arose because 
comparatively higher market risk stocks grew as a percentage of the stock market. Applying 
the arguments we have given in the paper, one should therefore expect that old economy 
companies should have found funding easier despite the competition from high tech stocks. 
Analysis by Campello and Graham (2013) shows that this is exactly the case. They document 
significant increases in investment by, and stock price increases of, non-tech firms during this 
period. They also find significant stock issuance by non-tech firms. They do not investigate the 
mechanism behind what they refer to as ‘cross-sectoral spill-over price effects’ but they do 
attribute it to aggregate stock price changes and overvaluation of the market. In contrast, our 
results in this paper provide a formal justification for the effects identified in Campello and 
Graham (2013), which do not depend on overvaluation per se but lie purely in the composition 
change that took place in the market.  In addition to adding useful insight into the effects of the 
dot-com boom on old economy sectors, this evidence also serves as further strengthening of 
the arguments for the real impact of composition effects.  
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Figure 1. Market risk as a function of weight for a two sector (A and B) market. That is 
1βwβw BBAA   where sector A (B) is a lower (higher) risk sector. 
Panel A:  0.11cov0.36,σ0.09,σ A.B
2
B
2
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Panel B: 0.cov0.36,σ0.09,σ A.B
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Figure 2. Ratios of the average of market capitalisation of the banking sector as a fraction of 
the market capitalisation of the corresponding stock market during the financial crisis to the 
equivalent average over the same length period before the crisis. The start of the financial crisis 
is defined as August 2007 (darker bars) or September 2008 (lighter bars). The G20 countries 
are grouped into those without systemic banking crisis (green bars), marginal banking crisis 
(blue bars) and with the systemic banking crisis (red bars).  
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Figure 3. The pre-crisis market risk of the banking sector versus the change in the market risk 
of the industrials sector for 13 G12 countries. The triangles denote countries classified by 
Laeven and Valencia  (2013a) as those which major systemic banking crisis, the diamonds 
denote ‘marginal’ cases of the systemic banking crisis and the circles denote countries that did 
not experienced the systemic banking crisis in the period 2008-2013. 
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Figure 4. Change in the difference of the market risk of the utilities and the industrials for 11 
G12 countries. The blue bars denote countries classified by Laeven and Valencia  (2013a) as 
those which major systemic banking crisis, the red bars denote ‘marginal’ cases of the systemic 
banking crisis and the green bars denote countries that did not experienced the systemic 
banking crisis in the period 2008-2013.  
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Table 1.  Summary statistics of daily stock market -returns for indexes based on Kevin French data (panel A) 
and for daily log-returns (x100) of S&P1500 indexes provided by DataStream (Panel B). Panel A is based on 
4677 observations (1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014) and Panel B is based on 2641 observations (3 February 
2004 – 31 July 2014). 
 Mean  Median  Min  Max  St. dev  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Panel A 
RU49 0.041  0.080  -8.920  14.430  1.136  0.235  16.821 
RI49 0.049  0.090  -9.480  10.020  1.301  -0.222  8.463 
RC49 0.051  0.090  -7.820  9.960  1.173  -0.144  9.047 
RB49 0.044  0.050  -16.98  16.960  1.946  0.426  16.805 
RM – Rfree 0.030  0.080  -8.950  11.350  1.253  -0.105  9.999 
SMB 0.006  0.020  -4.620  4.290  0.606  -0.274  6.963 
HML 0.014  0.010  -4.860  3.950  0.634  0.083  8.712 
RMW 0.019  0.000  -2.860  4.060  0.485  0.329  5.622 
CMA 0.015  0.000  -5.900  2.510  0.458  -0.570  10.960 
Rfree 0.010  0.010  0.000  0.030  0.009  0.047  1.500 
Panel B 
RSPU 0.032  0.080  -8.500  12.469  1.137  0.047  1.500 
RSPUelectricity 0.038  0.079  -8.623  12.865  1.140  0.384  16.582 
RSPUgas 0.048  0.079  -10.942  14.973  1.365  -0.062  18.750 
RSPUwater 0.038  0.001  -8.876  11.664  1.474  0.222  10.222 
RSPUmulti 0.043  0.098  -7.761  11.046  1.111  0.283  15.010 
RSPI 0.035  0.067  -9.458  9.190  1.361  -0.356  8.368 
RSPB 0.013  0.009  -24.101  25.385  2.702  0.500  19.917 
RSPM 0.032  0.072  -9.459  10.958  1.249  -0.233  10.679 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of daily stock market log-returns (x100) for the DS calculated stock market 
indexes (RM), banking indexes(RB), industrials indexes (RI) and utilities indexes (RU) for G12 countries 
(except for the Netherlands and Sweden for which RU are not available) over 1 January 1996  - 31 July 2014 
(4848 observations). 
 Mean  Median  Min  Max  St. dev  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Australia              
RM  0.036  0.032  -8.658  5.778  0.970  -0.486  6.541 
RB 0.054  0.034  -8.494  9.686  1.240  0.035  5.591 
RI   0.035  0.019  -10.298  5.053  1.108  -0.553  5.283 
RU   0.050  0.019  -10.436  8.140  1.230  -0.180  4.538 
Belgium              
RM  0.034  0.051  -8.125  8.240  1.127  -0.158  5.874 
RB 0.005  0.030  -25.407  18.604  2.335  -0.331  11.120 
RI   0.040  0.020  -10.719  11.427  1.649  -0.052  5.032 
RU   0.046  0.015  -9.928  16.656  1.096  0.813  16.332 
Canada              
RM  0.038  0.068  -9.563  8.979  1.060  -0.687  9.530 
RB 0.056  0.024  -14.050  12.168  1.345  0.135  9.762 
RI   0.052  0.006  -12.055  12.403  1.708  0.088  5.578 
RU   0.054  0.032  -6.782  7.975  0.871  -0.196  7.398 
France              
RM  0.035  0.049  -8.411  9.938  1.294  -0.089  4.666 
RB 0.032  0.026  -13.418  18.326  2.157  0.208  6.892 
RI   0.031  0.007  -21.767  25.072  1.825  0.350  20.946 
RU   0.023  0.013  -12.325  21.352  1.853  0.293  8.386 
Germany              
RM  0.029  0.067  -7.787  16.062  1.265  0.084  9.149 
RB 0.000  0.014  -16.458  15.869  1.904  -0.073  9.552 
RI   0.041  0.024  -11.733  14.697  1.686  -0.113  5.731 
RU   0.022  0.023  -10.738  14.748  1.511  0.028  7.605 
Italy              
RM  0.025  0.034  -8.611  10.509  1.370  -0.136  4.432 
RB 0.018  0.022  -11.940  15.802  1.886  -0.114  5.334 
RI   0.013  0.005  -10.038  11.975  1.666  0.106  2.857 
RU   0.038  0.019  -10.258  12.211  1.422  0.234  7.595 
Japan              
RM  0.003  0.005  -9.838  12.304  1.313  -0.333  6.030 
RB -0.022  0.002  -12.822  14.119  1.859  0.201  4.592 
RI   0.010  0.004  -19.469  13.071  1.815  -0.349  5.613 
RU   0.014  0.007  -12.344  9.079  1.312  -0.098  5.229 
Netherlands              
RM  0.025  0.057  -9.199  9.323  1.301  -0.286  5.597 
RB -0.017  0.008  -127.00  15.176  2.324  -6.919  210.265 
RI   0.040  0.023  -13.143  13.355  1.742  -0.175  6.055 
Spain              
RM  0.038  0.075  -8.469  11.772  1.330  -0.059  4.717 
RB 0.038  0.033  -14.251  19.080  1.853  0.283  8.517 
RI   0.041  0.020  -10.913  10.126  1.607  -0.025  3.044 
RU   0.047  0.080  -8.032  8.054  1.293  -0.464  4.063 
Sweden              
RM  0.043  0.041  -8.488  10.872  1.500  0.012  3.929 
RB 0.050  0.015  -10.746  14.673  1.858  0.354  6.007 
RI   0.048  0.029  -8.793  10.904  1.613  0.079  3.922 
Switzerland              
RM  0.028  0.034  -7.248  9.826  1.090  -0.218  5.850 
RB 0.013  0.009  -11.432  17.782  1.870  0.142  7.565 
RI   0.042  0.025  -17.015  17.350  1.431  -0.162  13.179 
RU   0.019  0.008  -7.252  10.470  1.025  0.044  7.678 
UK              
RM  0.028  0.041  -8.692  8.885  1.127  -0.216  6.133 
RB 0.017  0.015  -19.428  18.829  1.858  -0.069  11.522 
40 
 
RI   0.022  0.026  -10.347  9.664  1.459  -0.192  4.026 
RU   0.045  0.039  -9.223  11.858  1.104  -0.028  7.850 
US              
RM  0.032  0.049  -9.396  10.913  1.232  -0.258  7.749 
RB 0.021  0.011  -21.641  19.351  2.120  0.115  17.106 
RI   0.016  0.016  -9.673  12.079  1.547  -0.293  6.453 
RU   0.030  0.046  -9.267  14.188  1.284  -0.282  10.356 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients of daily returns on the five risk factors provided on 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research. 
Panel A: 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014; Panel B: 1 January 1996 – 8 August 2007; Panel C: 9 August 
2007 – 31 July 2014   
          
 RM – Rfree  SMB  HML  RMW  CMA 
Panel A          
RM – Rfree 1.000         
SMB 0.029  1.000       
HML -0.137  -0.133  1.000     
RMW -0.376  -0.381  0.160  1.000   
CMA -0.344  -0.048  0.540  0.216  1.000 
 
Panel B  
 
       
RM – Rfree 1.000         
SMB -0.074  1.000       
HML -0.639  -0.209  1.000     
RMW -0.374  -0.450  0.448  1.000   
CMA -0.477  -0.085  0.706  0.272  1.000 
 
Panel C  
 
       
RM – Rfree 1.000         
SMB 0.158  1.000       
HML 0.456  -0.015  1.000     
RMW -0.437  -0.235  -0.501  1.000   
CMA -0.141  0.053  0.161  -0.021  1.000 
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Table 4. Tolerance indicators for the daily returns on the five risk factors provided on 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research. 
 3 Factors  5 Factors 
RM-Rfree 0.264  0.244 
(RM-Rfree)xD07 0.306  0.279 
SMB 0.549  0.430 
SMBxD07 0.579  0.500 
HML 0.315  0.202 
HMLxD07 0.393  0.277 
RWM   0.483 
RWMxD07   0.507 
CMA   0.411 
CMAxD07   0.659 
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Table 5. Regression results for Eq.(2) specification using KF-data for the 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014 period (4677 daily observations).  D07 is equal to 1 from 9 August 
2007 till 31 July 2014 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance.  
Panel A 
 RI4 9- Rfree  RC49 - Rfree  RB49 - Rfree  RU49- Rfree  RU49 - RI49  RU49- RC49 
Constant  -0.001  -0.001  0.000***  -0.014  -0.014  -0.015 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
D07 0.012  0.015**  -0.019***  0.032**  0.015  0.014 
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
RM-Rfree 1.012***  0.933***  1.063***  0.777***  -0.228***  -0.154*** 
 (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
(RM-Rfree)xD07 0.066***  0.066***  0.124***  -0.100***  -0.167***  -0.179*** 
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
SMB 0.212***  0.186***  -0.289***  0.045***  -0.223***  -0.188*** 
 (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
SMBxD07 0.088***  0.044***  0.355***  -0.149***  -0.278***  -0.237*** 
 (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.037)  (0.033) 
HML 0.314***  0.284***  0.276***  0.906***  0.566***  0.564*** 
 (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
HMLxD07 -0.274***  -0.310***  0.784***  -0.782***  -0.497***  -0.394*** 
 (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
R2 adj. 0.904  0.920  0.800  0.585  0.321  0.253 
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Table 6. Regression results for Eq. (3) specification using KF-data for the 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014 period (4677 daily observations).  D07 is equal to 1 from 9 August 
2007 till 31 July 2014 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance.  
Panel A 
 RI4 9- Rfree  RC49 - Rfree  RB49 - Rfree  RU49- Rfree  RU49 - RI49  RU49- RC49 
Constant  0.013**  -0.005  -0.010  -0.015  -0.014  -0.010 
 0.006  0.004  0.008  0.010  0.012  0.011 
D07 -0.004  0.014**  -0.003  0.025*  0.014  0.010 
 0.009  0.007  0.015  0.016  0.019  0.017 
RM-Rfree 1.018***  0.953***  1.113***  0.781***  -0.230***  -0.169*** 
 0.007  0.005  0.010  0.012  0.015  0.014 
(RM-Rfree)xD07 0.075***  0.069***  0.010  -0.068***  -0.141***  -0.149*** 
 0.010  0.007  0.017  0.018  0.021  0.020 
SMB 0.241***  0.248***  -0.164***  -0.004  -0.226***  -0.229*** 
 0.010  0.008  0.017  0.019  0.022  0.020 
SMBxD07 0.065***  -0.004  0.174***  -0.192***  -0.273***  -0.200*** 
 0.017  0.012  0.029  0.031  0.038  0.033 
HML 0.201***  0.162***  0.242***  0.876***  0.681***  0.700*** 
 0.014  0.011  0.024  0.027  0.030  0.028 
HMLxD07 -0.210***  -0.230***  0.754***  -0.771***  -0.565***  -0.500*** 
 0.021  0.015  0.043  0.037  0.043  0.040 
RWM 0.082***  0.222***  0.372***  0.042*  -0.071**  -0.201*** 
 0.014  0.011  0.023  0.025  0.032  0.029 
RWMxD07 0.080***  -0.009  -0.906***  0.134**  0.118*  0.182*** 
 0.029  0.022  0.054  0.051  0.062  0.056 
CMA 0.133***  0.191***  0.094***  0.012  -0.159***  -0.194*** 
 0.016  0.012  0.026  0.027  0.032  0.029 
CMAxD07 0.082***  0.060***  -0.344***  0.242***  0.178***  0.189*** 
 0.029  0.022  0.060  0.054  0.064  0.058 
R2 adj. 0.908  0.935  0.811  0.592  0.312  0.266 
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Table 7.   Regression results for Eq. (4) specification using S&P1500 data collected from DataStream for the 3 February 2004 – 31 
July 2014 period (2641 daily observations).  D07 is equal to 1 from 9 August 2007 till 31 July 2014 and zero otherwise. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance.  
 RSPI  RSPB  RSPU   RSPUelectricity  RSPUgas   RSPUwater  RSPUmulti 
Constant  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001***  0.000  0.000  0.000** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
D07 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
RM  1.038***  0.864***  0.779***  0.749***  0.848***  1.043***  0.788*** 
 (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.045)  (0.028) 
RM xD07 0.090***  0.428***  -0.144***  -0.180***  0.012  -0.355***  -0.168*** 
 (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.048)  (0.030) 
R2 adj. 0.899  0.527  0.617  0.542  0.692  0.392  0.594 
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Table 8.   Regression results for Eq. (4) specification using S&P1500 data collected from DataStream for the 3 February 2004 – 31 July 2014 period (2641 daily 
observations).  D07 is equal to 1 from 9 August 2007 till 31 July 2014 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% 
significance and *: 10% significance.   
 RSPU – RSPi  RSPUelectricity – RSPI  RSPUgas – RSPI  RSPUwater – RSPI  RSPUmulti – RSPI 
Constant  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
D07 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
RM  -0.264***  -0.298***  -0.200***  -0.008  -0.240*** 
 (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.030)  (0.048)  (0.034) 
RMxD07 -0.229***  -0.260***  -0.073**  -0.425***  -0.262*** 
 (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.052)  (0.036) 
R2 adj. 0.186  0.191  0.022  0.113  0.217 
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Table 9. Regression results for Eq. (4) specification using DS-data for the G12 countries for the 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014 period (4848 daily observations). D07 is equal to 
1 from 9 August 2007 till 31 July 2014 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. 
 Panel A: RI   Panel B: RB 
 Const.  D07  RM  RM xD07  R2 adj.  Const.  D07  RM  RM xD07  R2 adj 
Australia 0.000  0.000  0.795***  -0.086***  0.384  0.000  0.000  0.901***  0.166***  0.652 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.021)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.015)   
                    Belgium 0.000**  0.000  0.622***  0.251***  0.290  0.000***  0.000  1.362***  0.230***  0.627 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.024)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.019)   
                    Canada 0.000  0.000  0.687***  -0.025  0.533  0.000*  0.000  0.791***  0.022  0.485 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.024)  (0.033)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.020)   
                    France 0.000**  0.000  0.969***  0.064***  0.810  0.000  -0.001*  1.072***  0.582***  0.648 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.012)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.015)   
                    Germany 0.000**  -0.001**  0.723***  0.421***  0.459  0.000  -0.001***  1.007***  0.272***  0.579 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.021)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.021)   
                    Italy  0.000  0.000  0.871***  -0.111***  0.434  0.000  0.000**  0.952***  0.468***  0.796 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.022)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.014)   
                    Japan 0.000**  -0.001**  1.020***  0.162***  0.606  0.000*  0.000  1.152***  -0.014  0.674 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.019)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.016)   
                    
Netherlands  0.001***  0.000  0.455***  0.626***  0.344  0.000  -0.001***  1.169***  -0.687***  0.340 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.025)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.022)   
Spain 0.000***  0.000*  0.673***  0.183***  0.626  0.000  0.000  1.094***  0.295***  0.865 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.013)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.010)   
                    Sweden 0.000**  0.000*  0.845***  0.347***  0.751  0.000  0.000  0.864***  0.308***  0.639 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.013)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.017)   
Switzerland 0.001***  0.000  0.577***  0.059**  0.235  0.000***  -0.001  1.263***  0.151***  0.696 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.027)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.023)   
                    UK 0.000  0.000  0.794***  0.221***  0.450  0.000  0.000  1.201***  0.144***  0.676 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.023)    (0.000)**  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.019)   
                    US 0.000  0.000  0.924***  0.189***  0.674  0.000**  0.000  1.005***  0.368***  0.635 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.015)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.020)   
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Table 10. Regression results for Eq.(4) specification using DS-data for 11 of the G12 countries for the 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014 period (4848 daily observations). D07 is equal to 1 from 
9 August 2007 till 31 July 2014 and zero otherwise.***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. 
  Panel A: RU  Panel B: RU - RI 
 Const.  D07  RM  RM xD07  R2 adj.  Const.  D07  RM  RM xD07  R2 adj. 
Australia 0.000**  0.000*  0.501***  0.247***  0.238  0.001**  -0.001**  -0.227***  0.260***  0.008 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.026)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.026)  (0.034)   
                    Belgium 0.000  0.000*  0.622***  -0.459***  0.229  0.000  0.000  0.016  -0.752***  0.116 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.015)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.024)  (0.032)   
                    Canada 0.000***  0.000  0.414***  0.049***  0.256  0.000  0.000  -0.259***  0.094***  0.043 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.016)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.027)  (0.037)   
                    France 0.000  0.000  0.909***  0.102***  0.485  0.000  0.000  0.723***  -0.116***  0.158 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.022)    (0.000)  (0.001  (0.024)  (0.034)   
                    Germany 0.000**  -0.001**  0.724***  0.104***  0.384  0.000  -0.001  -0.083***  -0.276***  0.029 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.019)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.018)   
                    Italy  0.000  0.000  0.627***  -0.148***  0.375  0.000  0.000  -0.126***  -0.129***  0.022 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.015)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.029)   
                    Japan 0.000  0.000  0.399***  0.129***  0.195  0.000  0.001  -0.597***  -0.116***  0.216 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.016)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.027)   
                    Spain 0.000  0.000  0.795***  -0.024  0.431  0.000  0.000  0.355***  0.085***  0.066 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.018)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.024)  (0.031)   
                    Switzerland 0.001***  -0.001***  0.123***  0.235***  0.110  0.000  -0.001***  -0.445***  0.229***  0.078 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.021)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.035)   
                    UK 0.000**  0.000  0.541***  -0.028  0.325  0.000**  0.000  -0.201***  -0.301***  0.058 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.020)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.031)   
                    US 0.000**  0.000  0.601***  0.114***  0.433  0.000**  0.000  -0.305***  -0.105***  0.091 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.016)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.022)   
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Appendix 1 
 
Assume that there are N assets in a market each of which has a return Ri, and standard deviation 
i. The return on the CAPM market portfolio based on these N assets is therefore equal



N
1i
iiM RwR , where wi denotes a capitalisation-based weight of asset i (i=1,2,…, N). 
Obviously, 1w
N
1i
i 

 and 0w i   for every i =1,…,N. To investigate the impact of changes in 
asset weights on market risk let us assume that it is asset N that experiences a change in its share 
in the market portfolio, and look at the effect of its change on the rest of the  market.  
To simplify the notation let us denote   
Z
1N
1i
i ww 


.  Then, 1wwww NZ
1-N
1i
Ni 

, 
Moreover, we can write that 
ZZ
1N
1i
ii RwRw 


, where 



1N
1i
i
Z
i
ZZ R
w
w
wR . In other words,
1βwβw NNZZ  . Market risk of each asset n is therefore given as  
 
    NZZZNZZZ
NnZZnZ
n
wwww
ww
,
2222
,,
cov121
cov1cov




  
and the market risk of portfolio Z can be written as 
 
    NZZZNZZZ
NZZZZ
Z
wwww
ww
,
2222
,
2
cov121
cov1





                        (A1) 
where Zσ denotes the standard deviation of Z  and ji,cov denotes the covariance between assets i 
and j.  
Let us assume that asset N is more volatile than portfolio Z (i.e., ZN σσ  ) and has a higher 
market risk than portfolio Z (i.e., ZN ββ  ). To keep the case close to real market conditions, let 
us assume that portfolio Z and asset N are non-negatively correlated, i.e., 0cov NZ,  . Assume 
that the weight of asset N, i.e., Nw changes. 
Given that we are interested in changes in  that result from changes in Nw ( NZ w1w  ), the 
beta that corresponds to a given weight Zw will be denoted )(wβ ZZ .  
Proposition 1 
If NZ   , 0cov , NZ  and NZ  , , NZ ,cov remain constant as Zw  changes then, for any 'Zw  
such that 1)'(wβ ZZ  , )()'( ZZZZ ww   for every 'ZZ ww  . 
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Before we prove Proposition 1 it is useful to prove the following Lemma 1: 
 
Lemma 1 
For any two, positively correlated assets, A and B,  
BA,
2
B
2
A cov
2
σσ


 
where 2Aσ , 
2
Bσ and BA,cov denote the variance of A, variance of B and covariance of A and B 
respectively, and 2B
2
A σσ  . 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
We begin by assuming that the opposite is true, i.e., 
2
σσ
cov
2
B
2
A
BA,

 . Then, given that 
1
σσ
cov
BA
BA,
  (A and B are less than perfectly correlated) it would be true that  
1
σσ
cov
σ2σ
σσ
BA
BA,
BA
2
B
2
A 

. 
which would imply   0σσ 2BA  , which is impossible.  
□ 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, note that 1
σ
cov
(0)β
2
N
NZ,
Z   and 1(1)βZ  . Moreover, there is some 1w1  such that 
1)(wβ 1Z  , although this need not be in the unit interval. To find 1w  we need to solve the 
equation  
      NZ,11
2
N
2
1
2
Z
2
1NZ,1
2
Z1 covw12wσw1σwcovw1σw   
which can be rewritten as: 
    0covσw3cov2σσw2covσσ NZ,2N1NZ,2N2Z21NZ,2N2Z  . 
There always are two solutions to the above equation: 
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 NZ,2N2Z
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2
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1
2covσσ2
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If  0covσ NZ,
2
Z  , then 1w
'
1   and ,  
1
2covσσ2
covσ
w
NZ,
2
N
2
Z
NZ,
2
N''
1 


 , given Lemma 1 and the 
fact that  
2
N
4
N
2
N
2
ZNZ, σσσσ cov  . This, however, means that 
''
1w  is outside of the allowed 
range of 
Zw , as [0,1]w Z  . 
If  0covσ NZ,
2
Z  , then 1w
''
1   and  
1
2covσσ2
covσ
w
NZ,
2
N
2
Z
NZ,
2
N'
1 


 .  
To determine the values of w for which the beta (i.e., (w)βZ ) increases and decreases, let us 
focus on the properties of beta’s first derivative. 
The sign of the first derivative of Zβ in regard to Zw  depends on the sign of the numerator as the 
denominator of the derivative (being the squared value of the market variance) is always 
positive. Simple algebraic operations allows the numerator of the first derivative of Zβ  to be 
expressed as: 
   
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If 0w Z  , then  
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because, from Lemma 1, we know that 
02covσσ NZ,
2
N
2
Z  . 
If 1w Z  , then   NZ,2Z2Z
1wZ
Z covσ-σ
dw
dβ
Numerator
Z
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, which is positive when 
 0covσ NZ,
2
Z  and non-positive when  0covσ NZ,
2
Z  . Notice that the quadratic form 
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  has the extreme point at
2
ZNZ,
NZ,
σcov
cov
w*

  which is positive and greater than one for  0covσ NZ,
2
Z  , and negative for 
 0covσ NZ,
2
Z  . Therefore, in both cases w* is outside of the allowed range of Zw .  
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Pulling all this information together distinguishes two cases: (i)  0covσ NZ,
2
Z  , and (ii) 
 0covσ NZ,
2
Z  .  
In case (i) the derivative of 
Zβ switches sign from positive to negative in the unit interval as 
shown below. 
 
In case (ii) the derivative of Zβ is positive for all values of Zw  in the unit interval, as shown 
below 
 
In case (i) Zβ as a function of Zw initially increases monotonically until it reaches a 
maximum on the unit interval, and then declines to unity (as is shown in the example in 
Figure 1 Panel A). Given that Zβ is equal to one when 1w
''
1  and 1w
'
1  , Zβ is an 
increasing function of Zw  for  
'
1Z ww  . 
In case (ii) the derivative is positive on [0,1], so Zβ increases in Zw .  
This proves Proposition 1. 
□ 
wZ 
dZ/dwZ 
w* 
1 
wZ 
dZ/dwZ 
w* 
1 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Variance equations for Table 5.  The variance equation of the error term is specified as  GARCH(p,q):




 
q
i
ti
p
i
tit
1
2
12
1
2
1
2  . Standard errors are in parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% 
significance and *: 10% significance. 
 RI49- Rfree  RC49- Rfree  RB49- Rfree  RU49- Rfree  RU49 –RI49   RU49 – RC49 
 0.002***  0.001***  0.002***  0.007***  0.005***   0.005*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001) 
 0.116***  0.089***  0.141***  0.192**  0.160***   0.155*** 
 (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.015)   (0.015) 
 0.062***  -0.055***  -0.085***  0.048**  -0.099***   -0.077*** 
 (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.015)   (0.016) 
 -0.072***  0.037**    -0.105***      
 (0.017)  (0.015)    (0.022)      
 0.173***  0.921***  0.941***  -0.002  0.934***   0.916*** 
 (0.125)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.073)  (0.005)   (0.007) 
 0.707***      0.855***      
 (0.115)      (0.069)      
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Table A2. Variance equations for Table 6.  The variance equation of the error term is specified as GARCH(p,q):




 
q
i
ti
p
i
tit
1
2
12
1
2
1
2  . Standard errors are in parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% 
significance and *: 10% significance. 
 RI49- Rfree  RC49- Rfree  RB49- Rfree  RU49- Rfree  RU49 –RI49   RU49 – RC49 
 0.001***  0.001***  0.002***  0.004***  0.005***   0.005*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001) 
 0.107***  0.105***  0.137***  0.191***  0.164***   0.158** 
 (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.015)   (0.014) 
 -0.044***  -0.050***  -0.080***  -0.119***  -0.104***   -0.083*** 
 (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.015)   (0.015) 
 0.929***  0.938***  0.941***  0.921***  0.934***   0.920*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.005)   (0.007) 
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Table A3. Variance equation coefficients for Table 7. The variance equation of the error term is specified as  GARCH(p,q):




 
q
i
ti
p
i
tit
1
2
12
1
2
1
2  . Standard errors are in parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% 
significance. 
 RSPI  RSPB  RSPU   RSPUelectricity  RSPUgas   RSPUwater  RSPUmulti 
 0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000**  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 0.100***  0.192***  0.135***  0.125***  0.120***  0.174***  0.129*** 
 (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.024) 
 -0.044**  -0.129***  -0.088***  -0.069***  -0.070***  -0.122***  -0.073*** 
 (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.015)  (0.021  (0.025) 
     0.012         
     (0.020)         
 0.931***  0.935***  0.928***  0.977***  0.938***  0.930***  0.926*** 
 (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.300)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
       -0.046       
       (0.275)       
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Table A4. Variance equation coefficients for Table 8. The variance equation of the error term is specified as  GARCH(p,q): 



 
q
i
ti
p
i
tit
1
2
12
1
2
1
2  . Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. 
 RSPU – RSPi  RSPUelectricity – RSPI  RSPUgas – RSPI  RSPUwater – RSPI  RSPUmulti – RSPI 
 0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 0.133***  0.141***  0.114***  0.178***  0.111*** 
 (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
 -0.076***  -0.083***  -0.065***  -0.129***  -0.049** 
 (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
 0.925***  0.925***  0.941***  0.939***  0.915*** 
 (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.011) 
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Table A5. Variance equation coefficients for Table 9. The variance equation of the error term is specified as  GARCH(p,q): 



 
q
i
ti
p
i
tit
1
2
12
1
2
1
2  . Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
 Panel A  Panel B 
                   
Australia 0.000***  0.110***  -0.084***  0.971***  0.000***  0.148***  -0.084***  -0.032***  0.965***   
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.002)   
Belgium 0.000***  0.113***  -0.091***  0.976***  0.000***  0.168***  -0.195***  0.035  1.688***  -0.695*** 
 (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.037)  (0.022)  (0.057)  (0.054 
Canada 0.000***  0.091***  -0.064***  0.971***  0.000***  0.159***  -0.089***  -0.025**  0.953***   
 (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.003)   
France 0.000***  0.057***  0.937***    0.000***  0.174***  -0.133***    0.959***   
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.015)    (0.002)   
Germany 0.000***  0.121***  -0.080***  0.955***  0.000***  0.187***  -0.133***    0.947***   
 (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.014)    (0.003)   
Italy 0.000***  0.106***  -0.069***  0.945***  0.000***  0.159***  -0.097***    0.934***   
 (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.016)    (0.005)   
Japan 0.000***  0.124***  -0.077***  0.948***  0.000***  0.200***  -0.140***    0.941***   
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.004)   
Netherlands 0.000***  0.128***  -0.103***  0.968***  0.000***  0.209***  -0.128***    0.926***   
 (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.003)  0.000  0.016  0.016    (0.003)   
Spain 0.000***  0.082***    0.893***  0.000***  0.156***  -0.059***    0.900***   
 (0.000)  (0.006)    (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.013)    (0.006)   
Sweden 0.000***  0.118***  -0.094***  0.973***  0.000***  0.114***  -0.078***    0.962***   
 (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.012)    (0.003)   
Switzerland 0.000***  0.114***  -0.100***  0.984***  0.000***  0.208***  -0.165***    0.951***   
 (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.015)    (0.004)   
UK 0.000***  0.086***  -0.055***  0.966***  0.000***  0.156***  -0.032  -0.088***  0.962***   
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.003)   
US 0.000***  0.115***  -0.089***  0.972***  0.000***  0.162***  -0.111***    0.948***   
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.000))  (0.015)  (0.016)    (0.003)   
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Table A6. Variance equation coefficients for Table 10. The variance equation of the error term is specified as GARCH(p,q): 



 
q
i
ti
p
i
tit
1
2
12
1
2
1
2  . Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. 
 Panel A  Panel B 
               
 0.000***  0.196***  -0.177***  0.979***  0.000***  0.086***  -0.066***  0.976*** 
Australia (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.002) 
 0.000***  0.207***  -0.094***  0.863***  0.000***  0.130***  -0.108***  0.975*** 
Belgium (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.002) 
 0.000***  0.079***  -0.022***  0.930***  0.000***  0.127***  -0.096***  0.966*** 
Canada (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.003) 
 0.000***  0.220***  -0.177***  0.951***  0.000***  0.183***  -0.139***  0.946*** 
France (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
 0.000***  0.140***  -0.085***  0.934***  0.000**  0.138***  -0.096***  0.961*** 
Germany (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.002) 
 0.000***  0.109***  -0.066***  0.954***  0.000***  0.112***  -0.083***  0.966*** 
Italy  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.003) 
 0.000***  0.143***  -0.102***  0.956***  0.000***  0.086***  -0.043***  0.950*** 
Japan (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.005) 
 0.000***  0.103***  -0.065***  0.961***  0.000***  0.119***  -0.079***  0.953*** 
Spain (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.004) 
 0.000***  0.168***  -0.126***  0.951***  0.000***  0.070***  -0.016***  0.934*** 
Switzerland (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
 0.000***  0.129***  -0.072***  0.921***  0.000***  0.106***  -0.064***  0.950*** 
UK (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.004) 
 0.000***  0.108***  -0.061***  0.951***  0.000***  0.136***  -0.101***  0.962*** 
US (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.003) 
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Table A7.  Regression results for Eq. (3) specification using DS-data for the G12 countries for the 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014 period (4848 daily observations). D08 is equal 
1 from 15 September 2008 till 31 July 2014 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. 
Panel A: RI  Panel B: RB 
 Const.  D08  RM  RM xD08  R2 adj.  Const.  D08  RM  RM xD08  R2 adj 
Australia 0.000  0.000  0.760***  0.003  0.381  0.000  0.000  0.901***  0.178***  0.649 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.023)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.016)   
                    Belgium 0.000**  0.000  0.637***  0.336***  0.295  0.000***  -0.001  1.372***  0.464***  0.637 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.030)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.020)   
                    Canada 0.000  0.001**  0.686***  -0.026  0.235  0.000*  0.000  0.792***  0.022  0.485 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.023)  (0.033)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.020)   
                    France 0.000  0.000  0.984***  0.042***  0.809  0.000  0.000  1.092***  0.593***  0.644 
 (0.000  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.012)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.015)   
                    Germany 0.000**  -0.001*  0.761***  0.372***  0.451  0.000  -0.001***  1.021***  0.253***  0.577 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.021)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.024)   
                    Italy  0.000  0.000  0.876***  -0.133***  0.436  0.000  -0.001**  0.970***  0.506***  0.797 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.022)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.015)   
                    Japan 0.000  -0.001**  1.027***  0.176***  0.606  0.000*  0.000  1.176***  -0.060***  0.674 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.018)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.016)   
                    Netherlands 0.001***  0.000  0.501***  0.556***  0.324  0.000  -0.001***  1.173***  -0.832***  0.352 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.028)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.024)   
Spain 0.000**  0.000  0.726***  0.098***  0.617  0.000  0.000  1.105***  0.321***  0.867 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.013)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.010)   
                    Sweden 0.000*  0.000  0.886***  0.309***  0.740  0.000***  0.000***  0.887***  0.301***  0.636 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.014)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.017)   
Switzerland 0.001***  0.000  0.569***  0.107***  0.237  0.000  -0.001**  1.271***  0.139***  0.694 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.028)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.026)   
                    UK 0.000  0.000  0.848***  0.162***  0.44  0.000  0.000*  1.210***  0.158***  0.675 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.023)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.021)   
                    US 0.000*  0.000  0.945***  0.170***  0.674  0.000  0.000*  1.020***  0.336***  0.625 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.016)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.021)   
 
 
 
60 
 
Table A8. Regression results for Eq. (3) specification using DS-data for 11 of the G12 countries for the 1 January 1996 – 31 July 2014 period (4848 daily observations). D08 is equal 1 from 
15 September 2008 till 31 July 2014 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. 
  Panel A: RU  Panel B: RU - RI 
G12(11) Const.  D08  RM  RM xD08  R2 adj.  Const.  D08  RM  RM xD08  R2 adj. 
Australia 0.000***  -0.001**  0.515***  0.265***  0.241  0.001**  -0.001**  -0.190***  0.230***  0.007 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.016)  (0.024)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.021)  (0.034)   
                    Belgium 0.000  0.000  0.521***  -0.333***  0.215  0.000  0.000  -0.097***  -0.700***  0.111 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.015)    (0.000)  (0.001  (0.020)  (0.034)   
                    Canada 0.000***  0.000  0.429***  0.016  0.253  0.000  -0.001  -0.238***  0.065  0.041 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  (0.016)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.026)  (0.037)   
                    France 0.000  -0.001**  0.899***  0.141***  0.485  0.000  0.000  -0.100***  0.119***  -0.005 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.022)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.026)   
                    Germany 0.000***  -0.001***  0.715***  0.153***  0.386  0.000  -0.001*  -0.084***  -0.239***  0.023 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.019)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.019)   
                    Italy  0.000*  0.000  0.623***  -0.152***  0.375  0.000  0.000  -0.141***  -0.109***  0.021 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.014)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.029)   
                    Japan 0.000  0.000  0.400***  0.139***  0.196  0.000  0.000  -0.597***  -0.146***  0.216 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.016)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.027)   
                    Spain 0.000  0.000  0.793***  -0.024  0.430  0.000  0.000  0.028  -0.062***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.017)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.025)   
                    Switzerland 0.001***  -0.001***  0.148***  0.191***  0.103  0.000  -0.001***  -0.413***  0.137***  0.072 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.023)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.037)   
                    UK 0.000***  0.000  0.546***  -0.049**  0.324  0.000**  0.000  -0.249***  -0.261***  0.053 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.020)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.032)   
                    US 0.000***  0.000  0.609***  0.114***  0.343  0.000***  0.000  -0.316***  -0.095***  0.091 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.016)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.022)   
 
